The present paper introduces an innovative approach for anomaly-based IDS. The main idea is to construct model that characterizes the expected/acceptable behavior of the system using a clustering algorithm based on a 2-means clustering anomaly detection technique and a classification tree. Methods for clustering, training and detection are provided. The applied parameter, considered for performance measurement, is the Rand index. Index Dunn and C-index are used in order to determine whether the clusters are compact and well separated.
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, network security and intrusion detection have become a critical and intense research area. Intrusion detection systems (IDS) are among the most important defend-in-depth strategies. The term "intrusion detection" refers to a variety of methods and techniques for searching and discovering malicious and unauthorized activities. Despite the prevention techniques IDS has set a perfect platform to defend the confidentiality, integrity and security aspects of cyber world. IDS analyses information about users' behavior from various sources such as system table and network usage data [1] .
Intrusion detection systems are based on two fundamental approaches: the detection of anomalous behavior as it deviates from normal behavior, and misuse detection by monitoring those "signatures" of those known malicious attacks and system vulnerabilities. Anomaly (behavior-based) IDSs assume the deviation of normal activities under attacks and perform abnormal detection compared with predefined system or user behavior reference model [2] . The anomaly-based approach has the ability to discover new and previously unknown attacks, since it does not rely on previously composed database of exploit signatures. Moreover, they do not need to update their data in contrast to misuse-based systems, which require regular updates of their signature database and cannot detect novel attacks.
Anomaly detection refers to the important problem of finding non-conforming patterns or behaviors in live traffic data. These non-conforming patterns are often known as anomalies, outliers, discordant observations, exceptions, aberrations, surprises, peculiarities or contaminants in different application domains [3] . In order to distinguish the normal and abnormal behavior, the system should be "learned" to recognize normal user activity. The system behavior is modeled as a set of system call sequences [4] , which occur during 'normal' execution of some privileged processes. Since they perform their task with administrative rights, they are of special interest of the attackers as attack targets. When the observed sequences deviate from the expected behavior the program is assumed to perform something unintended, possibly because of a security violation.
One basic anomaly detection technique is data mining methodology including classification using clustering. K-means is one of the simplest learning algorithms, which has found wide-spread application in IDS. The major idea is to divide the observed data into non-intersecting sets based on their specific features. It is a kind of unsupervised classification of objects into groups, referred to as clusters. From a machine learning perspective, clusters correspond to hidden patterns, the search for clusters is unsupervised learning, and the resulting system represents a data concept. Therefore, clustering is unsupervised learning of a hidden data concept [5] . The motivation for using the clustering algorithms, combined with data mining techniques is to extend the capabilities of the approach and to improve the effectiveness of the state-of-the-art intrusion detection systems.
In this work we are interested in finding methodology for the attacks detection during the current activities in the system. As our goal is to distinguish the normal activity patterns from abnormal ones, a clustering algorithm was applied. The present methodology consists of two stages -the first one consists of the clustering algorithm, which divides the current activity data into two non-interceptive sets, containing the normal and intrusive activity, respectively. The second one includes the comparison of the marked as anomalous activity with preliminarily composed classification trees with normal activity sequences, using string distance metrics.
The outline of the paper is as follows: some related work is introduced in Section II; the methodology is presented in Section III; the experimental analyses are shown in Section IV. In Sections V and VI some results of quality evaluation of a cluster algorithm, based on Rand index, and the cluster validity assessment, based on Dunn index and C-index, are introduced. Finally, Section VII contains the conclusion.
RELATED WORK
There is a lot of previous work in this topic, since it has been observed that clustering techniques are efficient for classifying system activity.
Anomaly Detection with fast incremental clustering (ADWIC) is presented in [6] . This algorithm use extended BIRCH [2] clustering algorithm to implement fast, scalable and adaptive anomaly detection scheme. Clustering is applied as a technique for training of the normality model.
In [7] Yang et al. present an anomaly detection approach based on clustering and classification for intrusion detection. Clustering are performed to group training data points into clusters, from which some clusters are selected as normal or known attack profile according to certain criterion. Those training data, excluded from the profile, are used to build a specific classifier. During the testing stage, they utilize influence-based classification algorithm to classify network behaviors.
In [8] a clustering based supervised anomaly detection technique is presented. A set of training data, consisting of normal data only, is divided into clusters which are represented by their profiles to form the normality model. Any deviation from the normality model is treated as attack.
In [9] is introduced an approach, which combines the techniques of K-means clustering and OneR classification. The proposed algorithm are partitioned the set of data into several clusters according to a seed point into each clusters centroids.
Zhengjie Li et al. [10] published new anomaly detection method based on K-means clustering algorithm and Particle swarm optimization algorithm, in order to get a more precise clustering efficiency.
Yassin et al. integrated K-means clustering and Naïve Bayes Classifier to create anomaly-based IDS which reduce false alarm rate and improve accuracy to detect intrusion [11] . In the first step algorithm uses K-Means to identify groups of samples that behave similarity and dissimilarity, and in second step it uses Naïve Bayes in order to classify all data into correct category.
New clustering technique using K-means, fuzzy neural network and SVM classifiers is proposed by A. Chandrasekhar and K. Raghuveer in [12] . The algorithm consists from four basic steps: first, to generate different training subsets using K-Means, second, to train different neuro-fuzzy models, third, SVM classification and last step, radial SVM classification to detect intrusion.
The different approaches are proposed for intrusion detection using K-Means combined with other algorithms. They have many advantages but they are not good in all aspects. The efforts are devoted to search for a model with better binary classification performance. Furthermore, all enumerated methods were tested and evaluated on network data.
The present paper proposes an unsupervised method of anomaly detection, based on 2-means clustering algorithm. The main purpose is to create and test a methodology for the attacks detection during the normal activities in the system. As our goal is to distinguish the normal activity patterns from abnormal ones, the intrusion detection process is considered as a binary classification problem and a 2-means clustering approach is applied. The proposed method works on unlabeled data and does not need any previous knowledge about the current activity data in order to detect new intrusions. The proposed approach is examined with a host-based scenario and the obtained results are evaluated and considered.
DESCRIPTION OF THE METHODOLOGY

Detection Method
The presented methodology addresses the issue of the anomaly based IDS. The proposed method analyses data collected by monitoring the behavior at the level of the privileged processes. The current activity data is divided into two non-intercepted clusters, which contain the normal and intrusive activity patterns, respectively. The distances to the cluster centroids of the corresponding cluster are calculated using the Damerau-Levenshtein distance. An object is classified as normal if it is closer to the normal cluster centroid than to the anomalous one, and vice versa. In our case with two clusters: if the observation P is closer to the normal cluster, therefore P is normal. This classification based on the distances enables the detection of various anomalies and has the potential to discover unknown attacks or variations of previously existing attacks.
The normal activity database is created using data mining techniques, i.e. classification trees, whose nodes consist of system calls sequences. Then the intrusion detection algorithm is performed using string metrics between normal and current system call sequences.
The Damerau-Levenshtein Distance
The Damerau-Levenshtein distance (DLD) ( [13, 14] ) is a string metric between two strings, which means the minimum number of operations (an insertion, deletion, substitution of a single character, a transposition of two characters) needed to transform one string into the other. Let the weighting for the cost of transforming symbol a into symbol b be denoted by w (a, b). w (a, b) is the cost of a symbol substitution a → b, w (a, ε) is the cost of deleting a and w (ε, b) is the cost of inserting b. The DLD are computed using the following recurrence relation
where cost function has following definition
It calculates the cost of the optimal string alignment, which does not equal the edit distance. The cost of the optimal string alignment is the number of edit operations needed to make the strings equal under the condition that no substring is edited more than once.
PROPOSED CLUSTERING ALGORITHM
K-means clustering is the algorithm of cluster analysis, which groups the objects in K disjoint clusters based on the distance function. In our case, we want to divide them into two classes, one of the normal data, and the other -from the anomalies. The algorithm in this case consists of the following steps:
• Step 1. Two arbitrary different objects for centers -one of the normal observations, and the otherfrom the anomalies, are selected.
• Step 2. Calculate the distance between all observations and cluster centers.
• Step 3. When all observations are classified in their closest clusters then the centers of clusters are recalculated. We determine the j new center by
-the measure of the distance between two vectors, in this case -DLD.
• Step 4. Recalculate the distance between each observations and new obtained cluster centers.
• Step 3 is repeated until all observations were reassigned.
CLASSIFICATION TREE
In our case the normal activity patterns compose a set with N states in number: q 1 , q 2 , . . . , q N , through which the system passes during its work in discrete moments of time t =1, . . . , T . We calculate the elements of the matrix, which are the state transition probabilities, assuming the probability of occupying a state is determined only by the preceding state. Each state transition probability represents the probability of transitioning from a given state to another possible one.
During the initial stage we construct classification trees at level L, describing normal activity. The roots represent each possible state q k . The states for which the corresponding transition probabilities from their predecessor are non-zero are inheritors for each vertex.
By traversing the trees from the roots to the leaves, we can receive all possible state sequences with length L, along with the corresponding transition probabilities. The obtained lists of system calls consist of all possible sequences with given state in k th position and contain states for which the transition probabilities for each couple of neighbors is non-zero.
As a final step the following methodology to distinguish the normal activity patterns from abnormal ones was applied. Let the observed system calls sequence is y. Fixing each position of y we go over the branches of the trees with same vertex in corresponding level. Within the obtained lists of normal state sequences the string distance between the received sequence and the normal sequences was applied. This value is used in order to determine whether the observed sequence is normal or anomalous, along with the number of errors.
SIMULATION EXPERIMENTS
An empirical testing of the proposed methodology was performed on the data, generated and published by the researches in Immune Systems Project from the Computer Science Department, University of New Mexico. The data were obtained from Unix system examination during some period of time and consist of normal user activity patterns of some privileged processes executed on behalf of the root account as well as some anomalous data. The methods for pattern generation are described in [4, 15] . They substantiate that the short sequences of system calls are reliable discriminator between normal and anomalous activities in the system. Each pattern is a sequence of system calls, which are the results of the examined process. The input data files are sequences of ordered pairs of numbers, where each line consists of one pair. The first number in each pair is the process ID (PID) of the process executed, and the second one is the system call number.
The experimental data include traces of user activity during some period of time. The described methodology was applied in order to distinguish normal user activity from abnormal one for the following privileged processes: synthetic sendmail, login, inetd, named. The examined data contain respectively 297, 705, 308 and 610 sequences of system calls for the enumerated processes.
PERFORMANCE MEASURES
Evaluation of the performance of the classification model is based on the counts of test records correctly and incorrectly predicted by the model -four points of concern. These four points are the following: true positives TP (alerted on intrusion attempt), false positives FP (alerted on benign activity), true negatives TN (not alerted on benign activity) and false negatives FN (not alerted on intrusion attempt). True positive rate (TPR) is defined as the fraction of positive examples predicted correctly by the model, i.e., TPR=TP/(TP+FN). The true negative rate (TNR) is defined as the fraction of negative examples predicted correctly by the model, i.e., TNR=TN/(TN+FP). The false positive rate (FPR) is the fraction of negative examples predicted as positive class, i.e., FPR=FP/(TN+FP). Finally, the false negative rate (FNR) is the fraction of positive examples predicted as negative class, i.e., FNR=FN/(TP+FN).
One of the measures of quality of a cluster algorithm using external criterion is the Rand index [7] . The Rand index (RI) computes how similar are the clusters, returned by the clustering algorithm. One can also view this index as a measure of the percentage of correct decisions made by the algorithm. It can be computed using the following formula:
One issue with the Rand index is that false positives and false negatives are equally weighted. Intuitively, the best similarity between partitions requires both TP and TN to be large, and FP and FN to be small. When FP=FN=0, a complete coincidence between two partitions is arisen. The Rand Index gives a value between 0 and 1, where 1 means the two clustering outcomes match identically. Figure 1 presents the values of Rand index for the processes synthetic sendmail, named, login and inetd. The Rand index is correlated with the number of the clusters. It can be observed that the cluster purity is always above 65% excluding the value of the synthetic sendmail. As it could be seen the values in the table are still quite large and the quality of the method classification is rather good. Rand index returns low scores of clustering for the process synthetic sendmail, and in this case it is better the observations be divided into several smaller clusters.
The false alarm rate (FAR) is one of the most important operating parameters of the intrusion detection system performance, since it measures the binary classification quality. It represents the number, during the examined period, of false detections of intrusions, i.e. the maximum number of false alarms tolerated by the user per unit time. Good detection methods should provide a low False alarm rate. Figure 2 represents the obtained values for the examined processes: Figure 2 . The values of False alarm rate for the synthetic sendmail, named, login and inetd.
From the results, presented at Figure 2 , could be seen that all values are between 0 and 0.04%, which means the proposed method achieves good classification results. Comparing the results produced by proposed methodology with the results obtained by the clustering algorithm, proposed by Wang and Megalooikonomou [16] , we see that our approach yield better results of FAR values as compared to their results (FAR values between 1.5% and 4.2%). El Mousaid, Toumanari and Elazhari proposed an intrusion detection, based on k-means clustering algorithm [17] . Comparing their results to the results obtained by the proposed methodology, we see that our method produces better results with some processes with respect to false alarms.
CLUSTER VALIDITY ASSESSMENT
When analyzing the cluster it is natural to assume that the cluster with a greater number of vectors is the cluster comprising the normal operation vectors, and the other contains anomalies. Vectors in the same cluster are similar, which usually means that they are "close" to each other. Although it seems illogical, in the case of large-scale attacks could be seen that more vectors are generated by anomalies of the normal vectors. For this reason for a better classification should be analyzed the structures of the clusters. For this purpose, the size and the distance between the clusters are calculated. The compactness is used to describe similarities between objects in the same class. As a measure for cluster compactness is used intra-cluster distance:
-the measure of the distance between two vectors in cluster Ki. It is small when the objects are close to their cluster-centroids. It increases if the number of clusters decreases.
The separability measure provides an evaluation of distances between the classes. Inter-cluster distance is applied for separability measure. It is small when there are a few large clusters. One way to calculate it is to find the shortest distance between two observations, belonging to two different clusters. Higher the inter cluster distance indicates much better distance between the cluster centers.
In order to evaluate validation through which assesses the compactness of the clusters and the distances between them, we use Davies-Bouldin index and C-index.
• Davies-Bouldin index ( [18, 19] ) takes into account both the error, caused by representing the data vectors with cluster centroids, and the distance between clusters. It is defined as follows:
where n is the number of clusters, • C-index. The C-index [20] is a cluster similarity measure expressed as:
where S is the sum of all distances between pairs of observations in the same cluster over all clusters. Let n be the number of these pairs. S min and S max are the sums of n lowest/highest distances across all pairs of observations. The numerator measures how many pairs of observations of the a nearest neighboring pairs belong to the same cluster, and the denominator is a scale factor. Good clustering quality requires small intra-cluster distances. The smaller nominator leads to lower values of the C index and therefore to good clustering quality. The C-index is limited to the interval [0, 1] and it should be minimized. When the clusters have very different cardinality the inter-cluster distances and intra-cluster distances are not equally considered in the indexes. This may affect to the values of C index and to reflect on clustering quality evaluations. Figure 4 . The values of C-index for the synthetic sendmail, named, login and inetd. Figure 4 depict the C-index for the processes synthetic sendmail, named, login and inetd. The value of the index lies in the interval (0,3668; 0,4613). As can be seen from the figure, the results of the C-index are still large. These values could be explained with the kind of data, which is host-based and contains patterns of various user activities. This leads to a dispersed type of normal and intrusive clusters, which contain different types of pattern sequences.
CONCLUSIONS
The IDS are very successful tools as a second line of the system defense. Besides the attack detection, their purpose is to cause the attacker spend sufficient amount of resources in order to make the intrusion cost high enough. Finally, the actions of the intruder would be logged and analyzed, which increases the potential risk for the attacker.
The presented model relies on 2-means clustering algorithm, rounded out with a methodology, based on classification trees and distance-based comparison of the system call sequences. The obtained results represent that the proposed methodology yields reliable and stable results during the simulation experiments stage. The focus of future work could be a comparison of the results with those, produces by some different distance metrics and different data sets.
